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I. Introduction
U.S. banks, particularly the largest, have dramatically expanded their retail banking operations over the last few years. This increased focus has been widely noted with industry observers emphasizing the critical importance deposit-taking via a strong branch network, while extolling retail's virtue in terms of returns, stability, and growth potential.
Standard & Poor's concluded that "an increasing emphasis on the retail sector has become the stand-out characteristic supporting the success of these institutions" (in reference to six of the largest U.S. bank holding companies) 1 , while Business Week noted that "after years of envying investment banks, many lenders have decided the traditional banking biz ain't so bad after all." 2 Similarly, The American Banker concludes that "retail makes an above-average contribution to most banks' P/E and market-to-book ratios" 3 and a study by
Morgan Stanley and Mercer Oliver Wyman describes retail banking as the "Cinderella of U.S.
financial services…high margins, stable income, and modest capital consumption." 4 This is in sharp contrast to the late 1990s when many large banks shifted their focus toward less traditional banking activities like investment banking and insurance, and attempted to shift consumers out of the branch and into alternative delivery channels like automated teller machines, electronic banking, and telephone call centers.
This paper examines the link between retail banking activity and performance for U.S.
banks from 1997 to 2004 to better understand the drivers and the impact of the renewed focus on retail banking. In particular, we compare measures of both equity market returns and accounting profits to measures of retail banking intensity. This allows us to evaluate the conventional wisdom that has emerged in the last few years that retail banking offers stable revenue flows and also relatively high returns. This study is the first, to our knowledge, to systematically examine the risk and return of the retail-based banking strategies that have emerged in recent years.
One difficulty, however, is that there is no single definition that consistently delineates retail banking from other financial activities. In annual reports, for instance, some define retail as deposit-taking activity, consumer lending, and small business lending, while others include national credit card operations or mortgage businesses. An important contribution of our paper, therefore, is to develop three metrics of retail banking focus that can be consistently generated from bank regulatory reports. These measures are the retail loan share, the deposit retail share, and branches per dollar of assets. These metrics cover several complementary aspects of a bank's retail banking activities, one based on the asset side, one based on liabilities, and the third based on a key retail banking delivery channel. These measures are correlated, so we also extract the first principal component to develop a single measure of retail banking intensity. This summary measure has risen substantially over the period [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] , after declining during the previous five years, which supports the notion of a renewed focus on retail banking activities.
Our empirical approach for understanding the relative risks and return of retail banking is straightforward. We regress ex post measures of performance like return on equity (ROE), stock market returns, and stock market volatility on these metrics, controlling for other factors that might affect performance. Our sample includes 3110 annual observations for 708 distinct institutions that operated between 1997 and 2004.
We find that the data are not fully consistent with the perceived wisdom about the relative stability and higher returns associated with retail banking. Greater retail banking intensity, for example, tends to lower equity market volatility only for the very largest bank holding companies (assets exceeding $10 billion). For small and mid-sized bank holding companies, the relationship between retail banking intensity and market volatility is weak.
A key factor in this result is the role of branches: greater branching intensity leads to lower volatility for large banking organizations, but to higher volatility for smaller ones. Our interpretation is that large branch networks for the biggest banks are more likely to span many markets and thus provide the benefits of geographic diversification. 5 In addition, branch-based retail activities may be a more potent hedge for the relatively high-risk activities like trading and capital market services that the largest banks pursue. In either case, because analysts typically focused on large institutions, our finding does lend some support to the claim that branch-based activities are relatively stable. Regardless of organization size, however, higher retail banking intensity is also consistently associated with lower average returns, measured both with market and accounting data.
Our bottom line conclusion is that that while retail banking may be a relatively stable activity, particularly for the largest banks, it is also a relatively low return one. This is completely reasonable from a traditional finance perspective where firms trade off risk and expected return, but counters the perception of some that retail activities offer the possibility of both high returns and low risk. Given the historical shifts in strategies among banks, one implication is that the current focus on retail may simply be a cyclical response to the lowreturns and turbulence in capital market activities since 2000. If so, we may expect waning interest in retail as relative returns rise in other activities.
II. The Return to Retail Banking
The U.S. banking industry has undergone considerable changes over the last two decades in response to major deregulation, financial innovation, and technological advance.
This section discusses one recent trend -the return to retail banking -and places it in the larger context of the evolving banking industry. To do so, we examine analyst reports, industry commentary, and the statements of bankers. While this information is in some sense "soft," it does provide a useful and novel perspective on the evolution of banking strategies.
Our discussion begins in the mid-1990s with the well-known Reigle-Neal Act of 1994, which allowed banking and branching on a nationwide scale. There is considerable evidence that this law capped a period of deregulation that fundamentally changed the way banks operate, altered the competitive dynamics of the industry, and directly impacted economic outcomes across U.S. states. Although retail banking has received considerable attention in recent years, there is no generally agreed upon definition among analysts or bankers. In annual reports and other financial statements, large commercial banks frequently report results for retail-oriented business segments that include consumer deposit-taking and lending and small business financial services. These services are provided through a range of distribution channels, with brick-and-mortar branches being the most prominent (others include internet sites and call centers). Some institutions also have consumer credit businesses -particularly mortgage origination and credit cards, both prime and sub-prime -that are provided on a national scale that is separate from the firm's branch-based retail activities. In some cases, these businesses are grouped with branch-based activities into a single "retail" business segment, while in other cases, they are reported as separate business lines in financial statements. Those institutions that provide retail brokerage services almost universally include these activities in a broader brokerage or asset management business line rather than in the "retail banking" segment. Finally, at some institutions, the "retail" business segment also contains financial services provided to middle-market corporate customers, though it is becoming increasingly common for these activities to be grouped with services provided to larger corporations.
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Drawing from these sources, we propose a broad definition of retail banking that encompasses deposit-taking, lending, and other financial services provided to consumers and small businesses through all delivery channels, including branches, loan offices, call centers, and the internet. Our definition encompasses national consumer credit businesses. The diversity of customers, products and services, and delivery channels covered by this definition suggests that a meaningful metric of retail banking intensity should be similarly broad.
Potential candidates might be the share of revenue or profit derived from these activities or the share of risk capital allocated to these business units. The advantage of using regulatory report data is that they are available on a consistent basis for all banking organizations over a relatively long period of time.
The first measure we generate is the retail loan share, defined as credit card, other consumer, 1-to-4 family mortgage (including home equity), and small business loans as a share of all loans held on the balance sheet. In contrast, the retail loan share at smaller institutions has been falling since the mid-1990s.
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These contrasting trends have reversed the ordering of retail banking intensity across asset size categories over the sample period, with the very largest institutions now having the greatest focus on retail lending as indicated by this metric.
A similar picture emerges when we examine our second retail banking metric, the retail deposit share. This measure is defined as NOW account, small time, and savings account deposits as a share of total deposits. These deposits are the types most likely to be held by consumers and, to a lesser extent, small businesses. Although consumers and small business also hold non-interest-bearing demand deposits and large time deposits (those exceeding $100,000), we exclude these balances from our retail deposit measure because a significant portion are derived from non-retail customers, such as mid-sized and larger businesses, especially at larger banks. has been driven by the very largest banking organizations, whose retail deposit share has increased steadily since the mid-1990s. In contrast, the retail deposit share has trended slightly downward at smaller institutions over this period. While these smaller institutions continue to have greater retail "intensity" by this measure, there has been very notable convergence across institutions of different asset sizes.
Our final metric of retail banking intensity departs from balance sheet measures of retail activity and instead focuses on a key retail banking delivery channel, bank branches. As noted above, despite considerable consolidation in the U.S. banking industry and the technology-driven emergence of alternative, lower cost delivery channels such as the internet and phone call centers, the number of brick-and-mortar bank branches has increased steadily since the mid-1990s. 27 A growing proportion of these branches is held in large branch networks. As of mid-2003, nearly 25 percent of U.S. branches were held by the 10 bank and thrift holding companies with 1000 or more branches, up from 11 percent in 1994 (Hirtle and Metli (2004) ). This shift is consistent with a greater focus on retail banking activities among largest organizations, as suggested by the retail loan share and retail deposit share variables.
Our third metric, therefore, is based on the number of branches held by each banking organization. Because number of branches is highly correlated with institution size, we divide the number of branches by total assets so that our measure captures differences in retail banking intensity across organizations rather than merely differences in scale. Note that we 26 Our retail deposit measure captures retail deposits held in domestic offices only. Regulatory reports contain information on deposits held in foreign offices, but do not break these deposits out by product type. While this may introduce some bias into our retail deposit measure, the bias is likely to be small, as few U.S. commercial banking organizations have significant foreign deposit-taking (branching) operations. 27 The growth in the number of bank branches in the U.S. differs from the experience in Europe, where the number of bank branches did not increase significantly during the 1990s (Humphrey et al. (2005) ).
use overall asset size, rather than a measure of retail-related assets, to capture the size of the branch network relative to the overall size of the institution; a branches-to-retail-assets measure would reflect retail banking efficiency rather than the degree of institutional focus on retail banking. The results discussed below are quite similar if we use alternative measures of institutional scale, including total loans, equity capital, and revenue. The asset figures we use are in billions of constant (2004) dollars. Thus far, we have illustrated trends in our retail banking metrics for the U.S. banking industry as a whole and for groups of institutions defined by asset size. While our measures are useful for tracking developments at an aggregate level, it is also important to establish that they capture cross-sectional differences in retail banking focus. As discussed above, there is no independent "all-in" measure of retail banking intensity available for a large number of banking institutions. However, several large bank holding companies report revenue and net income in their public financial disclosures broken out by recognizable retail banking business segments in ways that are consistent with our definition of retail banking. Using these data, we can calculate the share of net income and revenue -defined as net interest income plus non-interest income -from retail banking activities and examine the crosssectional correlation of these ratios with our retail banking metrics.
To do this, we collected data from annual reports and quarterly financial statements for 12 large bank holding companies from 2001 through 2005:Q2. 28 For each institution, we used these data to calculate annual retail revenue and retail net income shares -defined as revenue or net income from retail banking business segments as a share of the institution's aggregate revenue or net income. We then matched these revenue and net income shares with regulatory report data on retail loan share, retail deposit share, and branches scaled by assets from the previous year-end. Due to mergers and changes in financial statement reporting that make cross-year comparisons difficult, we lose some observations, resulting in a final sample of 52 BHC-year observations. 28 The BHCs are Bank of America, Bank of New York, Bank One, Citigroup, FleetBoston Financial, J.P. Morgan Chase, M&T, National City, SunTrust, U.S. Bancorp, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo. These firms were selected based on asset size, branch network size, and on whether they reported business segment financial information that allowed us to identify a retail banking business line consistent with our definition. This group does not necessarily represent an exhaustive list of bank holding companies for which such information may be available, but it is a representative sample spanning a range of asset sizes and extent of retail focus. Table 1 reports the results of some simple regression analysis examining the crosssectional correlation of the retail revenue and net income shares and our retail banking metrics. The regressions include year dummy variables and are estimated with robust standard errors that take account of the possibility of clustering by bank holding company.
We note that this sample includes only a small set of the very largest banks, so the statistical significance may not be particularly large as there may not be enough variation to precisely identify any relationships.
The results suggest a positive and significant correlation between the shares of revenue and net income accounted for by retail banking business lines and our retail banking metrics. The correlation is strongest for the retail loan share metric and for the first principal component of the three metrics and is weakest for the retail deposit share, but it is certainly evident for all the measures, both individually and jointly. Overall, this evidence supports the contention that our three retail banking metrics and their first principal component track crosssectional differences in retail banking intensity among these large institutions, as reflected in the "all-in" activity measures of revenue and net income.
Taken together, the retail banking intensity measures are consistent with the general view of the increased importance of retail activities in the U.S. banking industry. The balance-sheet-based measures suggest that this growth has been driven primarily by large bank holding companies, resulting in considerable convergence among institutions of different asset sizes. Somewhat in contrast, the branch-based measure suggests a continued differentiation across asset size categories in the degree of retail intensity. In the work that follows, we will use these three measures, as well as their common component, to examine the impact of differences in institution-level retail banking intensity on risk and return.
b) Measuring Return and Risk with Equity Market Data
Many observers have claimed that retail activities are relatively less volatile than other forms of banking activities like trading or underwriting. Theory, of course, suggests that high-risk activities will demand a premium in the form of higher returns, so one needs to evaluate both the risk and the return to judge relative performance across business lines. 29 In this section, we briefly discuss our measure of equity market return and risk.
We begin with daily equity market returns, including dividends and adjusted for splits, for each bank and cumulate these into weekly measures. We then define the return for bank i in a year t, R i,t , as the mean of those weekly returns. We define the risk of the bank as the standard deviation of those weekly returns in a year, t i, σ . This gives us an unbalanced panel of equity market risk and returns from 1997 to 2004. We also calculate a measure of riskadjusted returns, RAR i,t , as the ratio of average returns to the standard deviation of returns.
These three performance measures are calculated as:
where s is the weekly observation and S is the number of the bank's weeks in a year.
One issue is whether our focus should be on the total risk of the bank (as above) or on the idiosyncratic component that remains after common market forces have been controlled for. That is, one could estimate a market model and decompose the variance of returns, "total risk," into the model-predicted component, "systematic risk," and the variance of the residuals, "idiosyncratic" or "firm-specific risk." All three measures are informative and the choice depends on the specific question being addressed. For example, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) and Stiroh (forthcoming) are interested in questions about size-related diversification gains and theory suggests that idiosyncratic risk is the appropriate measure. A large, internally diversified firm should be able to shed the idiosyncratic component of it many exposures, so idiosyncratic risk should decline with size. An investor, on the other hand, may care primarily about the systematic part if idiosyncratic risk can be shed by holding a well-diversified portfolio.
Alternatively, regulators and supervisors will likely be interested in the total risk of a banking institution because default and market disruption could result from either the systematic or the idiosyncratic component. This can be seen in Merton-type portfolio models of credit risk, developed by Merton (1974) and implemented in KMV risk models, which are driven by assumptions about total asset return volatility and estimated using total equity return volatility. Similarly, risk-adverse managers may care about total risk if a large portion of their wealth is tied up in the firm's equity (Stulz (1984) ) or if they can't diversify their skills or human capital (Cummins et al. (1998) ). Bank borrowers may care about the total risk of the bank if failure breaks valuable, intangible banking relationships (Slovin et al. (1993) ) or if internal capital market frictions reduce lending and the efficient allocation of scarce capital resources (Houston et al. (1997) ). Finally, even shareholders will likely care about total volatility (and not just the systematic component as finance theory implies) due to nonlinear costs of external funds, non-traded risks, costs of financial distress, and the convexity in the corporate tax code (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998) ).
Our empirical work focuses on the total volatility of equity market returns as our preferred measure of risk. This reflects the broad importance of equity market volatility to regulators and supervisors, managers, borrowers, and investors. As robustness checks, we examined the link between the systematic and idiosyncratic components of total risk and found results that were broadly consistent.
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As a complement to market-based returns, we also examine average returns and return volatility based on accounting data. We calculate the average return on equity (ROE) for each bank holding company as the ratio of net income to end-of-period equity capital on a quarterly basis, and average across the four quarters in a year to get an annual figure. The volatility of returns is calculated as the standard deviation of quarterly ROE within a year. Risk-adjusted ROE is calculated as the ratio of average ROE to the within-year volatility of ROE.
c) Data and Regression Sample Construction
Our data set consists of information on equity market returns, accounting returns, balance sheet and income statement information, and branch data for publicly traded bank 30 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
IV. Empirical Results
Our basic empirical approach is to regress market-based and accounting-based measures of returns, return volatility, and risk-adjusted returns on our retail banking intensity metrics, as well as on a series of control variables. We then test to see whether cross-sectional differences in retail banking intensity are associated with higher returns and/or lower volatility, as has been claimed by analysts and bankers. We perform this analysis for the sample as a whole and for different sub-sets based on asset size.
The core regression equation is the following: These regressions, of course, are reduced form, so we include a set of control variables to capture a range of institution-specific factors that might affect performance. These include the log of BHC asset size and its square, the ratio of loans to assets, the ratio of deposits to assets, the log of the equity capital ratio, and variables controlling for the composition of the BHC's loan portfolio and revenue stream. We divide the loan portfolio into four broad categories -retail loans, non-retail C&I loans, non-retail real estate loans, and other loansand control for the share of loans in each category (non-residential real estate is the omitted category in the regression), as well as concentration across the categories, measured as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 31 We also control for the share of each BHC's revenue derived from non-interest income, as higher shares of non-interest income have been shown to be associated with higher return volatility (Stiroh and Rumble (forthcoming) and Stiroh (forthcoming)). Finally, we include a revenue HHI to control for concentration across the sources of each BHC's interest and non-interest income.
a) Full Sample
Tables 3 to 5 present the estimation results using equity market returns, market volatility, and risk-adjusted market returns, respectively, as the BHC performance measures.
The tables present specifications in which each of the three retail intensity metrics -retail loan share, retail deposit share, and branches scaled by assets -is included separately, as well as specifications where they are included together and in which the first principal component of the three metrics is included. To conserve space, the coefficients on the year dummy variables are not reported, though these variables are included in all specifications.
Turning first to Table 3 , the results indicate that greater retail banking intensity is consistently associated with lower average market returns. The coefficients on each of the three retail intensity metrics is negative and statistically significant (columns (1) to (3)), and the coefficients are negative and jointly significant when they are included together (column (4)). Finally, the coefficient on the first principal component is also negative and statistically significant.
While the impact of increased retail intensity is statistically significant, the estimates suggest that it is relatively small in economic terms. A one-standard-deviation increase in the retail loan share variable, for instance, would result in just a 0.08 standard deviation decrease in equity market returns (4.4 basis points). Even a simultaneous one-standard-deviation increase in all three retail banking metrics would decrease equity market returns by only 0.12 standard deviations (6.9 basis points), all else equal. 31 The HHI is calculated as the sum of the square of the shares of each category. As such, it ranges between 1.0 for a BHC with all its loans in a single category to 0.0 for a BHC with loans distributed evenly across a large number of categories. With 4 loan categories, the minimum value for the HHI is 0.25. 32 We divide revenue into net interest income, and into 4 components on non-interest income: fees on deposit accounts, fiduciary income, trading income, and other non-interest income.
We also note several other consistent results. First, there is consistent hump-shaped pattern between asset size and equity market returns with returns first rising and then falling with size, which suggests the presence of eventual diminishing returns. Second, capital is clearly important as banks with higher equity ratios show lower returns, on average. This could reflect a direct leverage effect or be a proxy for risk, e.g., high-risk institutions may hold less capital and earn higher returns. Third, non-interest revenue is largely insignificant as in Stiroh (forthcoming).
The picture is slightly more mixed with regard to the impact of retail banking activities on the volatility of market returns (Table 4 ). The balance-sheet-based retail intensity metrics -retail loan share and retail deposit share -suggest a negative relationship between retail banking activities and market return volatility. However, there appears to be a positive and marginally statistically significant relationship between branches scaled by assets and volatility, especially when all three metrics are included in the specification (column (4)).
The coefficient on the principal component variable is negative (column (5)), suggesting that the net effect of retail intensity on market return volatility may be negative, though the coefficient is significant only at the 19 percent level (see the last row of the table).
Given these differences in coefficient sign, the net impact of variation in retail banking intensity on market volatility is small. The estimates imply that a simultaneous one-standarddeviation increase in the three retail banking metrics would result in just a 0.040 standard deviation decrease in market volatility (6.2 basis points, as against a 1.56 percent standard deviation). A one-standard-deviation increase in the first principal component would result in a similarly sized impact on market volatility (7.4 basis points).
We also see no impact of size on volatility. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) argue that large banks are internally diversified, which lowers idiosyncratic volatility, but exploit those gains by holding lower capital ratios and making more high-risk loans. The net effect is that overall volatility is unrelated to size, as shown here. We also find that commercial and industrial loans are relatively high risk, as is common (Demsetz and Strahan (1997) and Stiroh and Rumble (forthcoming)). Finally, we see that concentration in both lending market and revenue sources, as measured by HHIs, tends to increase volatility as one would expect if there are diversification gains.
Combining the impact on returns and volatility in Table 5 , we find a significant negative relationship between retail banking intensity and risk-adjusted market returns. As with unadjusted returns, each of the three metrics enters the equation with negative and statistically significant coefficients, as does the first principal component (column (5)). This highlights our main conclusion that retail banking is not conditionally linked to improved risk-adjusted returns.
As check on these basic results, Table 6 presents results using accounting-based measures of returns (ROE) and return volatility as the BHC performance variables. For conciseness, the table presents just the specifications that include all three retail intensity metrics and the first principal component. The results based on accounting data are generally consistent with those based on market return data. The results suggest a negative and statistically significant relationship between retail banking intensity and average returns, though no significant relationship with return volatility or with risk-adjusted accounting returns. Again, we find no evidence that retail intensity is associated with higher riskadjusted returns.
b) Size-Based Sub-Samples
The review of the retail intensity metrics in Section II suggests that there are important differences among bank holding companies across sizes. To explore this observation further, and to develop a better understanding of our core results, we divide our sample into sub-sets by asset size and repeat the regression analysis. In particular, we separate the sample into those BHCs with assets less than $1 billion (roughly half the sample), those with assets between $1 and $10 billion, and the comparatively small number of BHCs (84) with assets greater than $10 billion. These results are presented in Tables 7 to 9 . Again, we report only the regressions with all three retail metrics and the first principal component.
The negative relationship between retail banking intensity and equity market returns is evident within the sets of both larger and smaller BHCs ( Table 7) . The coefficients on the retail loan share, retail deposit share, and branches scaled by assets variables are uniformly negative in all three partitions of the sample, as are the coefficients on the first principal components. The results are strongest for the $1-to-$10 billion sub-sample, where both the first principal component and three separate retail banking metrics are statistically significant at high confidence levels (see the last row of the table). 33 The coefficients are somewhat less precisely estimated for the under-$1 billion sub-sample, though the first principal component enters the equation with a statistically significant coefficient. The coefficients are least precisely estimated for the sub-set of very large bank holding companies (those with assets exceeding $10 billion), perhaps due to the comparatively small sample size (just under 400 observations for 84 bank holding companies). Higher branches-per-assets are significantly associated with lower returns for this subset of institutions, however.
We also note differences in the impact of the control variables across size classes. For example, the share of revenue from noninterest sources and revenue concentration are negatively linked to returns only for the largest banks. This likely reflects the very different set of activities in which these banks engage, e.g., more proprietary trading and capital market activities, and the different degree of intensity.
As before, the results for the market volatility specification are a bit more complex (Table 8 ). The first two columns suggest that the contrasting results for the overall samplein which increases in the retail loan and retail deposit shares were associated with decreases in volatility, while increases in retail intensity as indicated by branches-per-assets were associated with increases in volatility -are driven primarily by the smaller bank holding companies. The coefficients on retail loan share and retail deposit share are negative and jointly statistically significant, while the coefficient on branches-per-assets is positive and significant. The coefficient on the first principal component is negative, but not precisely estimated, consistent with the idea of a small net impact of increased retail intensity on market volatility for this group of institutions.
This pattern appears to reverse for larger bank holding companies, however. For midsized BHCs (those with $1 to $10 in assets), the coefficient on the retail loan share is negative and significant, while the coefficients on the other variables are essentially zero. The coefficient on the first principal component variable suggests a net negative impact of 33 The three retail banking metrics are jointly statistically significant. In results not reported here, the coefficient on each variable is negative and statistically significant when they metrics are included in the specification individually.
increased retail banking intensity for these firms, though the coefficient is not precisely estimated. This negative impact is more marked for the set of very large BHCs (those with assets exceeding $10 billion). Here, the coefficients on all three retail banking metrics are negative (though just marginally statistically significant), while the coefficient on the first principal component is more than three times the size for the mid-sized BHCs and is significant at the 6 percent confidence level.
The most striking change in impact across BHC asset size groups is for the branchbased retail banking metric. The coefficients on this variable go from large and positive in the under $1-billion sample to large and negative in the over-$10 billion cohort. A one-standard deviation increase in branches-per-assets would result in a 0.11 standard-deviation increase in volatility in the under-$1 billion sub-sample as compared to a 0.11 standard deviation decrease in volatility in the over-$10 billion group. These results suggest that for smaller bank holding companies, greater emphasis on branch banking increases volatility, while among large holding companies, the opposite is the case. A reasonable interpretation is that large branch networks of the very large banks span many geographical markets and thus provide diversification benefits. Table 9 illustrates the net effect of retail activity on equity market returns and volatility by examining risk-adjusted returns. Risk-adjusted returns are negatively associated with increased retail intensity for small and mid-sized bank holding companies. The coefficients on the individual retail banking metrics are negative and jointly statistically significant, as are the coefficients on the first principal component variable. For the very largest bank holding companies, however, there does not appear to be a significant relationship between retail banking intensity and risk-adjusted returns. While the coefficients are all negative, they are not individually or jointly statistically significant. Evidently, any reduction in volatility resulting from greater retail banking intensity is offset by a corresponding reduction in returns for these institutions.
Our results suggest that retail banking is a relatively low return activity for the full range of bank holding companies in our sample, but that these activities reduce institutionlevel risk only among the very largest firms. This result may reflect the broader range of activities pursued by large bank holding companies as compared to smaller ones, such as trading and capital market services, some of which are comparatively high risk. In addition, among large institutions, those with higher retail intensity may be diversified relative to the norm, whereas among smaller BHCs, those with a higher degree of retail focus may actually be more concentrated, to the extent that retail activities tend to be more dominant for these firms. Whatever the case, the net impact of greater retail intensity, in terms of risk-adjusted returns, is negative for small and mid-sized BHCs and neutral for the very largest.
A key factor in these findings is the role of branches, which appear to have opposite effect on market volatility for small and large banking companies. Greater branching intensity leads to higher market volatility for smaller bank holding companies, but to (marginally) lower volatility for large ones. The finding for large BHCs is consistent with trends in branching, which have seen more concentration of branches at these large institutions (Hirtle and Metli (2004)), and with the perception of analysts, who have focused on larger institutions.
V. Conclusions
The U.S. banking industry has recently renewed its focus on retail banking. This can be seen in the continued growth in bank branches, the motivation for recent large mergers, and industry commentary from a broad range of sources. Our study is the first, to our knowledge, to systematically examine the risk and return of retail-based strategies.
We conclude that a focus on retail activities is not associated with improved performance, measured by equity market returns and volatility, for the largest banks, and may actually lower performance for small and medium-sized institutions. For the largest banks that dominate U.S. banking, both equity market returns and volatility tend to fall with retail intensity. From a finance perspective, this is completely reasonable if consumer-driven retail banking is simply a low-risk, low-return business, but it does counter the perception of some that retail banking offers the advantages of both higher returns and higher risk.
Looking toward the future, we offer some speculation based the recent past. Our examination of the industry trends and commentary suggests a cyclical nature to the interest in retail activities. In this sense, the current level of focus may well be temporary as banks react to the turbulence in capital markets since 2000. As technology continues to evolve and relative returns in other financial activities improve, banks may once again switch their focus to developing other businesses and shifting away from the branch-centric mode of retail banking. results of regressions of the share of revenues and profits from retail banking activities as reported in public financial statements on three measures of retail banking intensity derived from bank holding company regulatory reports. The data are for 12 large bank holding companies whose public financial statements report business segment information for identifiable retail banking business lines over the years 2001 to 2005. The regressions include year dummy variables and the standard errors have been corrected to reflect the possibility of clustering by bank holding company. The rows labeled "Prob[Retail Variable = 0]" reports the p-value of the test of statistical significance of the coefficients on the retail intensity measure(s). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (2004) dollars. The regressions include year dummy variables and the standard errors have been corrected to reflect the possibility of clustering by bank holding company. The rows labeled "F-Statistic P-Value: Retail Variables Equal 0?" reports the p-value of the test of statistical significance of the coefficients on the retail banking intensity measure(s). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. .52
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